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A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games

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  • Quan Wen
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Abstract

We study repeated sequential games where players may not move simultaneously in stage games. We introduce the concept of effective minimax for sequential games and establish a Folk theorem for repeated sequential games. The Folk theorem asserts that any feasible payoff vector where every player receives more than his effective minimax value in a sequential stage game can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding repeated sequential game when players are sufficiently patient. The results of this paper generalize those of Wen (1994), and of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). The model of repeated sequential games and the concept of effective minimax provide an alternative view to the Anti-Folk theorem of Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) for asynchronously repeated pure coordination games. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 69 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 493-512

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:2:p:493-512

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Cited by:
  1. Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November.
  2. repec:dgr:uvatin:2009081 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. John Duggan, 2013. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection," Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy WP64, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  4. Stefan Buehler & Dennis L. Gäertner, 2013. "Making Sense of Nonbinding Retail-Price Recommendations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 335-59, February.
  5. Calcagno, Riccardo & Sugaya, Takuo & Kamada, Yuichiro & Lovo, Stefano, 2014. "Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
  6. MAHENC Philippe, 2007. "Cooperation among Overlapping Generations for a Public Project," LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse 07.08.229, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  7. Timothy N Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Coordinating Collective Resistance Through Communication And Repeated Interaction," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series, Monash University, Department of Economics 16/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  8. Dutta, Prajit K., 2012. "Coordination need not be a problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 519-534.
  9. Takahashi, Satoru & Wen, Quan, 2003. "On asynchronously repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 239-245, May.
  10. Harold Houba & Erik Ansink, 2013. "Sustainable Agreements on Stochastic River Flow," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 13-182/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  11. Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  12. repec:dgr:uvatin:2008120 is not listed on IDEAS

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