A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
AbstractWe study repeated sequential games where players may not move simultaneously in stage games. We introduce the concept of effective minimax for sequential games and establish a Folk theorem for repeated sequential games. The Folk theorem asserts that any feasible payoff vector where every player receives more than his effective minimax value in a sequential stage game can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding repeated sequential game when players are sufficiently patient. The results of this paper generalize those of Wen (1994), and of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). The model of repeated sequential games and the concept of effective minimax provide an alternative view to the Anti-Folk theorem of Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) for asynchronously repeated pure coordination games. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 69 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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