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On asynchronously repeated games

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  • Takahashi, Satoru
  • Wen, Quan

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 79 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 239-245

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:79:y:2003:i:2:p:239-245

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. Quan Wen, 2002. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 493-512.
  2. Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1995. "Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 110-115, April.
  3. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1467-1478, November.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  5. Quan Wen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Asynchronous Moves," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0204, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  6. Yoon, Kiho, 2001. "A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 191-200, January.
  7. Wen, Quan, 1994. "The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 949-54, July.
  8. Sorin Sylvain, 1995. "A Note on Repeated Extensive Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 116-123, April.
  9. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
  10. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0410001, EconWPA.
  2. Jan Libich, 2009. "A Note on the Anchoring Effect of Explicit Inflation Targets," CAMA Working Papers 2009-21, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

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