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Antitrust enforcement with price-dependent fines and detection probabilities

Author

Listed:
  • Harold Houba

    (VU University of Amsterdam)

  • Evgenia Motchenkova

    (VU University of Amsterdam)

  • Quan Wen

    (Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

We analyze the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in repeated oligopoly models in which both fines and detection probabilities depend on the cartel price. Such fines reflect actual guidelines. Inspections based on monitoring of market prices imply endogenous detection probabilities. Without monitoring, fines that are either fixed or proportional to illegal gains cannot eradicate the monopoly price, but more-than-proportional fines can. Policy design with inspections based on price-monitoring implies that the profit-maximizing cartel price always lies below the monopoly price independently of the fine structure. These results offer partial support for the current practice of monitoring and more-than-proportional fines.

Suggested Citation

  • Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2010. "Antitrust enforcement with price-dependent fines and detection probabilities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2017-2027.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00308
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I3-P185.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph, 2015. "Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201602, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 13 Jan 2016.
    2. Florence THEPOT & Jacques THEPOT, 2017. "Collusion, Managerial incentives and antitrust fines," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2017-06, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    3. Berkay Akyapi & Douglas C. Turner, 2022. "Cartel Penalties Under Endogenous Detection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(3), pages 341-371, November.
    4. Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph, 2020. "Penalising on the Basis of the Severity of the Offence: A Sophisticated Revenue-Based Cartel Penalty," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(3), pages 627-646, November.
    5. repec:tin:wpaper:20150141 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Emons, Winand, 2020. "The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    7. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2015. "Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 70-80.
    8. Bos, Iwan & Davies, Stephen & Harrington, Joseph E. & Ormosi, Peter L., 2018. "Does enforcement deter cartels? A tale of two tails," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 372-405.
    9. Houba Harold & Motchenkova Evgenia & Wen Quan, 2015. "The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 351-389, July.
    10. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2014. "Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-15, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    11. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2020. "Combining cartel penalties and private damage actions: The impact on cartel prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    12. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Motchenkova, Evgenia & Ulph, David, 2015. "Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 70-80.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated game; Cartel; Oligopoly; Antitrust enforcement; Competition policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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