Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
AbstractAn alternating-offers bargaining model in which a normal-form game determines players' payoffs in disagreement periods can have multiple perfect equilibria, provided that players are sufficiently patient. Even though there is perfect information, delay can arise and the length of delay depends only on the payoff structure of the disagreement game and not on the discount factor. On the other hand, not all feasible and individually rational payoffs of the disagreement game can be supported as average payoffs in equilibrium and some negotiation games have a unique perfect equilibrium with immediate agreement. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations in its series University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers with number 9108.
Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
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Postal: The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/
contracts ; economic models ; trade ; economic equilibrium;
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