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Lutz-Alexander Busch

Personal Details

First Name:Lutz-Alexander
Middle Name:
Last Name:Busch
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pbu143
http://arts.uwaterloo.ca/~lbusch

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Waterloo

Waterloo, Canada
http://economics.uwaterloo.ca/
RePEc:edi:dewatca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Phil Curry, 2007. "Excess Demand and Rationing: Selling to an Input," Discussion Papers dp07-11, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
  2. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 200010, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  3. Busch, L.-A. & Horstmann, I.J., 1995. "Concessions and the Agenda in Bargaining," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9511, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  4. Busch, L.A. & Wen, Q., 1993. "A Note on Unobservable Mixed Strategies in Negotiation Games," Working Papers 9311, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics.
  5. Busch, L-A. & Wen, Q., 1991. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9108, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.

Articles

  1. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Curry, Philip A., 2011. "Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 40-42, April.
  2. Fearon, Gervan & Busch, Lutz-Alexander, 2006. "Auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 657-678, May.
  3. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Govindan, Srihari, 2004. "Robust nonexistence of equilibrium with incomplete markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 641-645, September.
  4. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
  5. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 2001. "Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 563-579, July.
  6. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Quan Wen, 2001. "Finite Horizon Negotiation Games," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 2(2), pages 415-435, November.
  7. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 1999. "Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 956-975, August.
  8. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 1999. "Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 561-575.
  9. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius, 1997. "A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 144-148, April.
  10. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-565, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 200010, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Busch, Lutz Alexander & Muthoo, Abhinay, 2003. "Power and Inefficient Institutions," Economics Discussion Papers 8862, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    2. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    3. Zhylyevskyy, Oleksandr, 2012. "Spousal Conflict and Divorce," Staff General Research Papers Archive 34813, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017. "Multi-Lateral Strategic Bargaining Without Stationarity," Economics Series 332, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    5. Guoming Lai & Katia Sycara, 2009. "A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 169-187, March.
    6. Louta, Malamati & Roussaki, Ioanna & Pechlivanos, Lambros, 2008. "An intelligent agent negotiation strategy in the electronic marketplace environment," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 187(3), pages 1327-1345, June.
    7. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.

  2. Busch, L.-A. & Horstmann, I.J., 1995. "Concessions and the Agenda in Bargaining," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9511, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius, 1997. "A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 144-148, April.

  3. Busch, L-A. & Wen, Q., 1991. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9108, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.

    Cited by:

    1. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998. "Costly bargaining and renegotiation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3592, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Jinrui Pan & Craig S. Webb & Horst Zank, 2019. "Delayed probabilistic risk attitude: a parametric approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 201-232, September.
    3. Manzini, Paola, 1997. "Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 15-22, January.
    4. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    5. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2001. "Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 170-195, October.
    6. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1109, Econometric Society.
    7. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 260-276, August.
    8. Gao, Hong & Xu, Haibo, 2021. "Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    9. Lee, J. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0419, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    10. Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati', 2001. "Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes," Game Theory and Information 0112001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
    12. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 273-279, May.
    13. Hamid Sabourian & Jihong Lee, 2004. "Complexity and Efficiency in the Negotiation Game," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 82, Econometric Society.
    14. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    15. Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2006. "Wage Bargaining Under the National Labor Relations Act," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1017-1039, December.
    16. Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid, 2007. "Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 214-235, July.
    17. Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020. "Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version)," MPRA Paper 102926, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jul 2021.
    18. Bahar Leventoğlu, 2017. "Bargaining with habit formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 477-508, October.
    19. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 1997. "A Model of Bargaining with the Possibility of Arbitration," Game Theory and Information 9710001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Ana Paula Martins, 2010. "Splitting Games: Nash Equilibrium and the Optimisation Problem," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2010_36, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
    21. Harold Houba & Erik Ansink, 2013. "Sustainable Agreements on Stochastic River Flow," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-182/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    22. Paola Manzini, 1996. "Strategic bargaining with destructive power," Game Theory and Information 9612002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Calabuig, Vicent & Cunyat, Antoni & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2004. "Partially revocable commitments in a negotiation with a deadline," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 371-380, December.
    24. Ansink, Erik, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water Allocation," Sustainable Development Papers 54292, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    25. Houba, H., 1992. "Non-cooperative bargaining in infinitely repeated games with binding contracts," Serie Research Memoranda 0009, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    26. Harold Houba, 2008. "Computing Alternating Offers And Water Prices In Bilateral River Basin Management," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 257-278.
    27. J. Amegashie, 2011. "Incomplete property rights and overinvestment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 81-95, June.
    28. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Backward induction and unacceptable offers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 151-156.
    29. Taiji Furusawa & Quan Wen, 2001. "Unique Inneficient Perfect Equilibrium in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining with Complete Information," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0121, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    30. Hamid Sabourian & Jihong Lee, 2004. "Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Negotiation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 58, Econometric Society.
    31. Kumar, Vikas, 2011. "Negotiating constitutions for political unions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-76, March.
    32. Knabe, Andreas, 2009. "Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 161-176, March.
    33. Houba, Harold & Li, Duozhe & Wen, Quan, 2022. "Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    34. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(3), pages 1-6.
    35. Chiu Yu Ko & Duozhe Li, 2020. "Decentralized One‐To‐Many Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1139-1172, August.
    36. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2010. "A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences," MPRA Paper 38389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    37. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0706, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    38. Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    39. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
    40. Li, Duozhe, 2011. "The power to delay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 155-157, August.
    41. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2011. "Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 507-516.
    42. Ayşe Mumcu, 2010. "Strategic Withholding Of Firm‐Specific Skills In Wage Bargaining," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(2), pages 187-211, May.
    43. Catherine C. Langlois & Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, 2006. "Bargaining and the Failure of Asymmetric Deterrence: Trading off the Risk of War for the Promise of a Better Deal," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(2), pages 159-180, April.
    44. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    45. Vicente Calabuig, 1999. "Ineficiencias de las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados: un panorama," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(3), pages 303-329, September.
    46. Burkov, Andriy & Chaib-draa, Brahim, 2015. "Computing equilibria in discounted dynamic games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 269(C), pages 863-884.
    47. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.
    48. Wait, A., 2001. "Delays in Bargaining With Incompelete Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 809, The University of Melbourne.
    49. Houba, Harold, 1997. "The policy bargaining model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-27, August.
    50. King, Stephen P. & Maddock, Rodney, 1999. "Light-handed regulation of access in Australia: negotiation with arbitration," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-22, March.
    51. Andersson, Ola, 2006. "Bargaining in Collusive Markets," Working Papers 2006:21, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    52. Fengjiao Chen & Chiu Yu Ko & Duozhe Li, 2018. "On the role of outside options in wage renegotiation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 792-803, October.
    53. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2015. "Time Preferences and Bargaining," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/568, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    54. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Justifiable punishments in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 16-28.
    55. Uyanik, Metin & Yengin, Duygu, 2023. "Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 548-580.
    56. Jihong Lee & Hamid Sabourian, 2005. "Efficiency in Negotiation: Complexity and Costly Bargaining," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0505, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    57. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2007. "Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-070/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    58. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 2001. "Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 563-579, July.
    59. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Delay in a bargaining game with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(4), pages 339-353, December.
    60. Houba, Harold & Sneek, Koos & Vardy, Felix, 2000. "Can negotiations prevent fish wars?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1265-1280, July.
    61. Lucy White & Mark Williams, 2009. "Bargaining with imperfect enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 317-339, June.
    62. Abbring, Jaap H., 1999. "Commitment and wage bargaining in job matching models with costly search," Serie Research Memoranda 0021, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    63. Younghwan In, 2006. "A Note on Multi-Issue Bargaining with a Finite Set of Alternatives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 79-90, April.
    64. Furusawa, Taiji & Wen, Quan, 2002. "Disagreement points in trade negotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 133-150, June.
    65. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.
    66. Joan Esteban & Jozsef Sakovics, 1999. "Why do lions get the lion's share? A Hobbesian theory of agreements," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 37, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    67. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
    68. Li Duozhe & Wong Yat Fung, 2009. "Optimism and Bargaining Inefficiency," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-14, April.
    69. Mumcu, Ayşe, 1999. "Firm-Specific Skills, Wage Bargaining, and Efficiency," MPRA Paper 1913, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    70. Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael, 2015. "Breakdown in multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 478-484.

Articles

  1. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Curry, Philip A., 2011. "Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 40-42, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Sander, Christian J. & Thiem, Stefan, 2023. "Should football fans pay for security? Effects of a security fee," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 122-130.

  2. Fearon, Gervan & Busch, Lutz-Alexander, 2006. "Auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 657-678, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
    2. Gervan Fearon, 2009. "Economics of public good provision: auditing, outsourcing, and bribery," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3), pages 997-1022, August.

  3. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Govindan, Srihari, 2004. "Robust nonexistence of equilibrium with incomplete markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 641-645, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2012. "On the existence of financial equilibrium when beliefs are private," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12055, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    2. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2011. "Price uncertainty and the existence of financial equilibrium," Post-Print halshs-00587701, HAL.
    3. Lionel De Boisdeffre, 2015. "Price revelation and existence of financial equilibrium with incomplete markets and private beliefs," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 15037, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    4. V. Filipe MARTINS-DA-ROCHA & YIANNIS VAILAKIS, 2008. "Endogenous Transaction Costs," Discussion Papers 0810, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    5. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2013. "Price revelation and existence of equilibrium in a private belief economy," Post-Print halshs-01053471, HAL.
    6. Charalambos Aliprantis & Rabee Tourky, 2009. "Equilibria in incomplete assets economies with infinite dimensional spot markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 221-262, February.
    7. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2014. "Price revelation and existence of equilibrium in a private belief economy," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14056, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    8. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2015. "Price revelation and existence of financial equilibrium with incomplete markets and private beliefs," Post-Print halshs-01164142, HAL.
    9. Lionel De Boisdeffre, 2015. "Price revelation and existence of financial equilibrium with incomplete markets and private beliefs," Working Papers hal-02943034, HAL.
    10. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2015. "Price revelation and existence of financial equilibrium with incomplete markets and private beliefs," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01164142, HAL.
    11. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2013. "Price revelation and existence of equilibrium in a private belief economy," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01053471, HAL.
    12. Markeprand, Tobias, 2008. "On financial equilibrium with intermediation costs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 148-156, January.
    13. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2012. "On the existence of financial equilibrium when beliefs are private," Post-Print halshs-00746975, HAL.
    14. Lionel De Boisdeffre, 2015. "Price revelation and existence of financial equilibrium with incomplete markets and private beliefs," Working papers of CATT hal-02943034, HAL.
    15. Lionel de Boisdeffre, 2012. "On the existence of financial equilibrium when beliefs are private," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00746975, HAL.
    16. V. Martins-da-Rocha & Yiannis Vailakis, 2010. "Financial markets with endogenous transaction costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 65-97, October.

  4. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 2001. "Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 563-579, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Kimmo Berg & Gijs Schoenmakers, 2017. "Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14, November.
    2. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0706, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    3. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2011. "Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 507-516.
    4. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2007. "Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-070/1, Tinbergen Institute.

  6. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 1999. "Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 956-975, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Rudolf Vetschera & Michael Filzmoser & Ronald Mitterhofer, 2014. "An Analytical Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 71-99, January.
    2. Flamini, Francesca, 2007. "First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 138-157, May.
    3. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1109, Econometric Society.
    4. Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg, 2007. "Rent shifting and the order of negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1109-1125, October.
    5. Zhang, Linlan & Song, Haigang & Chen, Xueguang & Hong, Liu, 2011. "A simultaneous multi-issue negotiation through autonomous agents," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 210(1), pages 95-105, April.
    6. Andrea Canidio & Heiko Karle, 2021. "The Focusing Effect in Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9297, CESifo.
    7. Guoming Lai & Katia Sycara, 2009. "A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 169-187, March.
    8. D r. (elect.) Julia Korosteleva, "undated". "Maximising Seigniorage and Inflation Tax: The Case of Belarus," Working Papers 2006_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    9. Guoming Lai & Cuihong Li & Katia Sycara, 2006. "Efficient Multi-Attribute Negotiation with Incomplete Information," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(5), pages 511-528, September.
    10. Francesca Flamini, "undated". "Strategic Effects and Incentives in Multi-issue Bargaining Games," Working Papers 2005_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    11. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen & Jack Robles, 2001. "Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain," NBER Working Papers 8347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Francesca Flamini, "undated". "A Note on Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 2003_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    13. Lucy White & Mark Williams, 2009. "Bargaining with imperfect enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 317-339, June.
    14. Marina Fiedler & Carolin Blank & Arnold Picot, 2010. "Antecedents of Intentionally Incomplete Inter-Firm Contracts," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 62(62), pages 133-157, January.

  7. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 1999. "Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 561-575.

    Cited by:

    1. Rudolf Vetschera & Michael Filzmoser & Ronald Mitterhofer, 2014. "An Analytical Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 71-99, January.
    2. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1109, Econometric Society.
    3. Aviad Heifetz & Clara Ponsati, 2007. "All in good time," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 521-538, April.
    4. SangMok Lee, 2014. "Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 59-88, September.
    5. Snyder, Christopher M. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2005. "Multiproject contact in research joint ventures: evidence and theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 459-486, December.
    6. Andrea Canidio & Heiko Karle, 2021. "The Focusing Effect in Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series 9297, CESifo.
    7. Carraro, Carlo & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 6424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Guoming Lai & Katia Sycara, 2009. "A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 169-187, March.
    9. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.
    10. Guoming Lai & Cuihong Li & Katia Sycara, 2006. "Efficient Multi-Attribute Negotiation with Incomplete Information," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(5), pages 511-528, September.
    11. Mehmet Bac, 2001. "On Creating and Claiming Value in Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 237-251, May.

  8. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius, 1997. "A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 144-148, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1109, Econometric Society.
    2. Snyder, Christopher M. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2005. "Multiproject contact in research joint ventures: evidence and theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 459-486, December.
    3. Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January.
    4. Guoming Lai & Katia Sycara, 2009. "A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 169-187, March.
    5. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.
    6. Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.

  9. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-565, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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  1. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2007-06-18
  2. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2007-06-18

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