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Partially revocable commitments in a negotiation with a deadline

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  • Calabuig, Vicent
  • Cunyat, Antoni
  • Olcina, Gonzalo

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  • Calabuig, Vicent & Cunyat, Antoni & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2004. "Partially revocable commitments in a negotiation with a deadline," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 371-380, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:58:y:2004:i:4:p:371-380
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-1335, November.
    2. Antoni Cunyat, 2004. "The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 455-465, January.
    3. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-565, May.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
    5. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
    6. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
    7. Vicent Calabuig & Antoni Cunyat & Gonzalo Olcina, 2002. "Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 61-78.
    8. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1995. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(4), pages 619-637.
    9. Kalyan Chatterjee & Larry Samuelson, 1987. "Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(2), pages 175-192.
    10. Kalyan Chatterjee & Larry Samuelson, 1988. "Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(4), pages 605-618, August.
    11. Joel Sobel & Ichiro Takahashi, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(3), pages 411-426.
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