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Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment

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Author Info
Fershtman Chaim
Seidmann Daniel J.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45PTR0K-11/2/4ae367defa5a9d30c318551be75e349f
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 60 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 306-321
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:60:y:1993:i:2:p:306-321

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2008. "Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation," Working Papers tecipa-311, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lones Smith & Ennio Stacchetti, 2002. "Aspirational Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0201003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hendrikse, G., 1996. "Organizational change and vested interest," Discussion Paper 10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Juan J. Vidal Puga, 2006. "Reinterpreting The Meaning Of Breakdown," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Sven Fischer & Luis G. Gonzalez & Werner Güth, 2005. "(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static and Dynamic Bargaining Experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-41, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hsueh-Ling Huynh & Sumon Majumdar, 2006. "How to take an exam if you must: Decision under Deadline," Working Papers 1119, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
  8. Simon Gaechter & Arno Riedl, 2002. "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Jihong Lee & Hamid Sabourian, 2005. "Efficiency in Negotiation: Complexity and Costly Bargaining," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0505, Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2000. "Organizational Change and Vested Interests," Research Paper ERS-2000-17-ORG Revision_, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  11. Haruo Imai & Hannu Salonen, 2009. "Limit Solutions for Finite Horizon Bargaining Problems," Discussion Papers 51, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2008. "Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 457-474, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Vicent Calabuig & Antoni Cunyat & Gonzalo Olcina, 2002. "Bargaining with partially revocable commitments: a simple model," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(30), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  14. Duozhe Li, 2004. "Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  15. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2003. "Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 357-374, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. David Nickerson & Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand, 1994. "Strategic delay and endogenous offers in bargaining games with private information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 125-154, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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