This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jehiel, Philippe
Moldovanu, Benny

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The authors study the strategic equilibria of a negotiation game where potential buyers are affected by identity-dependent, negative externalities. The unique equilibrium of long, finitely repeated generic games can either display delay--where a transaction can take place only in several stages before the deadline--or, in spite of the random element in the game, a well-defined buyer exists that obtains the object with probability close to one. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199511%2963%3A6%3C1321%3ANEMCDI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 63 (1995)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1321-35
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:6:p:1321-35

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Wait, A., 2001. "Delays in Bargaining With Incompelete Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 809, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  2. Juan J. Vidal Puga, 2006. "Reinterpreting The Meaning Of Breakdown," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination," Working Paper Series 2006:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  5. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," Working Paper Series 2006:29, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. J. Patrick Meister & Kyle J. Anderson, 2007. "A Classroom Auction With Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions," Journal of Economic Education, Helen Dwight Reid Foundation, vol. 38(3), pages 297-307. [Downloadable!]
  7. Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati, 2003. "Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict," Game Theory and Information 0311008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Marchetti Nicolas & Serra Daniel, 2003. "A cooperative game for siting noxious facilities: theory and experimental design," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(22), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jonas Björnerstedt & Andreas Westermark, 2009. "The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 301-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2008. "Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 457-474, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Nicolas Marchetti, 2004. "Face to Face Negotiation to Overcome the Nimby Syndrome: Theory and Experimental Design," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-53, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  13. Kim-Sau Chung, 1997. "Inefficient Delays in Strategic Trades," Research in Economics 97-06-057e, Santa Fe Institute. [Downloadable!]
  14. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A, 2003. "Delay in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 3784, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition," Working Papers 05-10, Duke University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can import bibliographic info in various formats into you bibliographic tool, or just into your word processor. See under "publisher info" on each abstract page.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.