We study the effects of a between-cake discount factor in the agenda selection problem faced by a multi-issue committee. The presence of an interval of time between bargaining stages is a reasonable and realistic assumption. We show that this assumption simplifies the agenda selection problem strongly. In particular, the equilibrium multiplicity obtained in In and Serrano (2002) does not hold: a unique SPE can be established among the sequential bargaining procedures.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number
2003_15.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jeanette Findlay).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: