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Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

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Dilip Abreu
David G. Pearce
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000640.

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Date of creation: 08 Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000640

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  1. Kambe, Shinsuke, 1999. "Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 217-237, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1997. "Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-158, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-65, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Kornhauser, Lewis & Rubinstein, Ariel & Wilson, Charles, 1989. "Reputation and Patience in the 'War of Attrition.'," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(221), pages 15-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, 2000. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 85-118, January.
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  10. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2002. "On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1477-1517, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Nancy L. Stokey, 1981. "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 112-128, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  13. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-32, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
  18. Cripps, Martin W. & Dekel, Eddie & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2005. "Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 259-272, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 378-393, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Lones Smith & Ennio Stacchetti, 2002. "Aspirational Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0201003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  22. Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  23. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  26. Cripps, Martin W. & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1996. "Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 387-410, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Schmidt,Klaus M., 1991. "Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games of conflicting interests," Discussion Paper Serie A 333, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  28. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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