Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Reputation and Patience in the 'War of Attrition.'

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kornhauser, Lewis
  • Rubinstein, Ariel
  • Wilson, Charles

Abstract

This article presents an approach to selecting among the many subgame-perfect equilibria that exist in a standard concession game with complete information. The authors extend the description of a game to include a specific "irrational" (mixed) strategy for each player. Depending on the irrational strategies chosen, the authors demonstrate that this approach may select a unique equilibrium in which the weaker player concedes immediately. A player is weaker if he is more impatient or if his irrational strategy is to wait in any period with the higher probability. Copyright 1989 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427%28198902%292%3A56%3A221%3C15%3ARAPIT%27%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W&origin=repec
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 56 (1989)
Issue (Month): 221 (February)
Pages: 15-24

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:56:y:1989:i:221:p:15-24

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0427
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0013-0427

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W01, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
  4. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2008. "An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 67-76, January.
  6. Peter Burton, 2004. "Hugging Trees: Claiming de Facto Property Rights by Blockading Resource Use," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(2), pages 135-163, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:56:y:1989:i:221:p:15-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.