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Bargaining and Reputation

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Author Info
D. Abreu
F. Gul

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Abstract

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Paper provided by Economics Department, Princeton University in its series Princeton Economic Theory Papers with number 00s9.

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Date of creation: Dec 1998
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Handle: RePEc:wop:prinet:00s9

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  1. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  2. Raymond Deneckere & Meng-Yu Liang, 2001. "Bargaining with Interdependent Values," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20017, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    Other versions:
  4. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lones Smith & Ennio Stacchetti, 2002. "Aspirational Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0201003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christopher J. Tyson, 2004. "Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining," Economics Papers 2004-W23, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  7. Richard Mash, 2000. "Host Country-Foreign Investor Bargaining Power and Investment Incentive Provisions in Multilateral Investment Agreements," Economics Series Working Papers 047, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Roman Inderst, 2005. "Bargaining with a Possibly Committed Seller," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(4), pages 927-944, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsati & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," ESE Discussion Papers 75, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Saran Rene, 2007. "In Bargaining We Trust," Research Memoranda 049, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  11. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2007. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000898, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Duozhe Li, 2004. "Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  14. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001218, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
  17. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsat?Author-Name: Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 502.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  18. Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati, 2003. "Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict," Game Theory and Information 0311008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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