Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kambe, Shinsuke
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45GMF0D-S/2/8db94e5029c34e61838ff83026c0d925
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 217-237

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:217-237

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June.
    2. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
    3. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    4. D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
    5. Watson, Joel, 1993. "A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 199-205, January.
    6. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    7. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
    8. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine.
    9. Schmidt Klaus M., 1993. "Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 114-139, June.
    10. Abhinay Muthoo, . "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Economics Discussion Papers 420, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    11. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1993. "Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game," Munich Reprints in Economics 19778, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    12. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-37, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Britz Volker, 2010. "Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA.
    3. Inderst, Roman, 1999. "Bargaining with a Possibly Committed Seller," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-57, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    4. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
    5. Kobayashi, Hajime & Suehiro, Hideo, 2008. "Leadership by Confidence in Teams," MPRA Paper 10717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Amoros, Pablo & Moreno, Bernardo, 2006. "Bargaining and waning commitments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 417-422, September.
    7. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Li, Duozhe, 2011. "Commitment and compromise in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 203-211, February.
    9. Britz Volker, 2010. "Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining," Research Memorandum 056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    10. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Competition or collusion? Negotiating discounts off posted prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 341-354, April.
    11. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    12. Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    13. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
    14. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 0. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    15. Vincent Boitier, 2013. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: a Note on the Role of Reference Points," Working Papers hal-00878107, HAL.
    16. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    17. Lu, Yang K., 2013. "Optimal policy with credibility concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2007-2032.
    18. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2003. "Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 357-374, June.
    19. Segendorff, Björn, 2001. "Patience and Ultimatum in Bargaining," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 461, Stockholm School of Economics.
    20. Britz, Volker, 2013. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 345-351.
    21. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
    22. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:217-237. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.