Social Preferences? Google Answers!
AbstractWe analyse pricing, effort and tipping decisions in the online service "Google Answers" While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. In line with the related experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent users. Moreover, researchers seem to adjust their effort based on the user's previous tipping behaviour. An efficient sorting takes place when enough tip history is available. Users known for tipping in the past receive higher effort answers, while users with an established reputation for non-tipping tend to get low effort answers. In addition, we analyse how tipping is adopted when the behavioural default is not to tip and estimate minimum levels for the fraction of genuine reciprocator and imitator types.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-035.
Date of creation: 11 May 2009
Date of revision:
social preferences; reciprocity; moral hazard; reputation; Internet; psychological game theory;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C24 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-05-23 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-MKT-2009-05-23 (Marketing)
- NEP-SOC-2009-05-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Vera Angelova & Tobias Regner, 2012. "Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2012-011, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Schmidt, Klaus M. & Spann, Martin & Zeithammer, Robert, 2012.
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Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics
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- Schmidt, Klaus M. & Spann, Martin & Zeithammer, Robert, 2012. "Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 393, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Angelova, Vera & Regner, Tobias, 2013. "Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 205-218.
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