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Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
  3. Britz, Volker, 2013. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 345-351.
  4. Vincent Boitier, 2013. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: a Note on the Role of Reference Points," Working Papers hal-00878107, HAL.
  5. Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly," Discussion Paper 201-012, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2007. "Disagreement and Authority," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-037, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  7. Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro, 2018. "Hierarchical experimentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 365-404.
  8. Goerlach, Joseph-Simon & Motz, Nicolas, 2024. "A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-cooperative Games," IZA Discussion Papers 16809, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  9. Vincent Boitier, 2015. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: a Note on the Role of Reference Points," Post-Print hal-00878107, HAL.
  10. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2021. "A War of Attrition with Experimenting Players," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 239-269, June.
  11. Vincent Boitier, 2015. "The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: a Note on the Role of Reference Points," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00878107, HAL.
  12. Britz, V., 2010. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Research Memorandum 056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  13. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2015. "Commitment in alternating offers bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 12-18.
  14. Segendorff, Björn, 2001. "Patience and Ultimatum in Bargaining," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 461, Stockholm School of Economics.
  15. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
  16. Amoros, Pablo & Moreno, Bernardo, 2006. "Bargaining and waning commitments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 417-422, September.
  17. Ellingsen, Tore & Miettinen, Topi, 2014. "Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 353-366.
  18. Mehmet Ekmekci & Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities," Papers 2105.01581, arXiv.org.
  19. Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  20. Anna Sanktjohanser, 2020. "Optimally Stubborn," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2255, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  21. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
  22. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2011. "A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 1-27, May.
  23. Lu, Yang K., 2013. "Optimal policy with credibility concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2007-2032.
  24. Tsoy, Anton, 2018. "Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
  25. Sanktjohanser, Anna, 2022. "Optimally Stubborn," TSE Working Papers 22-1367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  26. Britz, V., 2010. "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  27. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 2000. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  28. Jonas Send & Marco Serena, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  29. Chung, Bobby W. & Wood, Daniel H., 2019. "Threats and promises in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 37-50.
  30. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
  31. David P. Myatt, 2005. "Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition," Economics Series Working Papers 160, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  32. Georgiadis, George & Kim, Youngsoo & Kwon, H. Dharma, 2022. "The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 171-185.
  33. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
  34. Hajime Kobayashi & Hideo Suehiro, 2008. "Leadership by Confidence in Teams," Discussion Papers 2008-35, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
  35. Kobayashi, Hajime & Suehiro, Hideo, 2008. "Leadership by Confidence in Teams," MPRA Paper 10717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  36. Ma, Zizhen, 2023. "Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
  37. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2003. "Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 357-374, June.
  38. George Georgiadis & Youngsoo Kim & H. Dharma Kwon, 2021. "The Absence of Attrition in a War of Attrition under Complete Information," Papers 2110.12013, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
  39. Li, Hongcheng, 2019. "Multi-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 109511, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Aug 2021.
  40. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.
  41. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
  42. Li, Duozhe, 2011. "Commitment and compromise in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 203-211, February.
  43. Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  44. Roman Inderst, 2005. "Bargaining with a Possibly Committed Seller," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(4), pages 927-944, October.
  45. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
  46. Ilkka Leppänen, 2020. "Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 783-799, April.
  47. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Competition or collusion? Negotiating discounts off posted prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 341-354, April.
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