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An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining

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  • Send, Jonas
  • Serena, Marco

Abstract

In alternating-offer bargaining, a seller is “insistent” if she demands the same asking price more than once. We provide empirical evidence on insistence and inform the theoretical literature by analyzing millions of eBay bargaining threads taken from Backus, Blake, Larsen, and Tadelis (2020). Focusing on the best predictors of first-period insistence, we find that insistence is sticky – a seller who was insistent in the past is more likely to be insistent in the future – and a seller is more likely insistent if the buyer has been particularly lenient or tough in her counteroffer.

Suggested Citation

  • Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:90:y:2022:i:c:s0167487022000320
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102516
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chessa, Michela & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Lardon, Aymeric & Yamada, Takashi, 2022. "The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    2. Petrowsky, Hannes M. & Schweinsberg, Martin & Seitz, Lennart & Funk, Burkhardt & Loschelder, David D., 2023. "Deal or no deal? How round vs precise percentage offers and price-ending mimicry affect impasse risk in over 25 million eBay negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    3. Xue, Lian & Sitzia, Stefania & Turocy, Theodore L., 2023. "Concord and contention in a dynamic unstructured bargaining experiment with costly conflict," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    4. Fanning, Jack, 2022. "Fairness and the Coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Stubbornness; eBay;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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