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Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory

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  • Paul Klemperer

    (Nuffield College Oxford University)

Abstract

This is an Invited paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and "standard" economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/mic/papers/0004/0004009.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0004009.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 13 Sep 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004009

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC; pages: 51; figures: included
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: Auctions; Bidding; Auction Theory; Private Values; Common Values; Mechanism Design; Litigation; Stock Markets; Queues; Financial Crashes; Brand Loyalty; War of Attrition; Bertrand; Perfect Competition; E-Commerce; Spectrum Auctions; Treasury Auctions; Electricity;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Papers 2002-W20, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  2. Paul Klemperer, 2001. "How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers 2002-W05, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, 03.
  4. Jan Boone, 2002. "’Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-18, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  5. Ali Hortacsu & Steven L. Puller, 2005. "Understanding Strategic Bidding in Restructured Electricity Markets: A Case Study of ERCOT," NBER Working Papers 11123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Stenborg, Markku, 2003. "Waiting for F/OSS: Coordinating the Production of Free/Open Source Software," Discussion Papers 884, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  7. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Alexia Gaudeul, 2009. "A (Micro) Course in Microeconomic Theory for MSc Students," Working Papers id:1986, eSocialSciences.
  9. Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  10. Uður Emek, 2002. "The Role of Auction Design in Awarding Spectrum," Game Theory and Information 0209001, EconWPA.
  11. Daniel A. Benitez, 2004. "On Quantity Competition and Transmission Constraints in Electricity Market," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 98, Econometric Society.

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