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Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game

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  • K. Schmidt

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 605.

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Date of creation: 08 Dec 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:605

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Cited by:
  1. Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2008. "Who Benefits From Online Privacy?," Working Papers, NET Institute 08-26, NET Institute.
  2. Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft dp1401, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  3. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2008. "The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  4. Juan I. Beccuti, 2014. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment: Extending to the Multi-Period Case," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft dp1402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  5. Kambe, Shinsuke, 1999. "Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 217-237, August.
  6. Cripps, Martin W. & Dekel, Eddie & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2005. "Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 259-272, April.

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