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Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party

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  • Jihong Lee

    (Birkbeck College University of London)

  • Qingmin Liu

    (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

of reputation building converges to a level strictly between 0 and 1. However, the two limiting cases differ in the number of third party signals invoked.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 151.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:151

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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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  1. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251, 04.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
  3. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1993. "Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game," Munich Reprints in Economics 19778, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, October.
  5. Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, October.
  6. Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
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