Reputation and Repeated Bargaining with a Third Party
Abstractof reputation building converges to a level strictly between 0 and 1. However, the two limiting cases differ in the number of third party signals invoked.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 151.
Date of creation: 2009
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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- Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003.
"Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251, 04.
- Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
- Schmidt, Klaus M., 1993. "Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game," Munich Reprints in Economics 19778, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521824019, October.
- Chamley,Christophe P., 2004. "Rational Herds," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521530927, October.
- Kremer, Ilan & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2007. "Dynamic signaling and market breakdown," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 58-82, March.
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