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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 618897000000000988.

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Date of creation: 28 Sep 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000988

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1. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
2. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . ""Who Wants a Good Reputation?''," CARESS Working Papres 98-12, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
   Other versions:
   • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," Penn CARESS Working Papers a3e3219aee004bd237f8112f9, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2000. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," CARESS Working Papres sell-rep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   • Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(2), pages 415-41, April.
3. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000470, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2079, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why Do Politicians Delegate?," NBER Working Papers 11531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000086, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
   • Martin W. Cripps & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]
   • Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000152, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2007. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 287-316, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . ""Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be''," CARESS Working Papres 98-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
   Other versions:
   • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," CARESS Working Papres rep-is-sep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
   • George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," Penn CARESS Working Papers bb1b279d6539c9ed3b83a027c, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
6. repec:att:wimass:192045 is not listed on IDEAS
7. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003. [Downloadable!]
   • Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Levine's Bibliography 618897000000000060, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation spillover across relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 209, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
10. Eyal Winter, 2001. "Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility," Discussion Paper Series dp266, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
11. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    • D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.