Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics

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Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics

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Guillermo Ordonez

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Guillermo L. Ordonez

Abstract

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 122247000000002250.

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Date of creation: 28 Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002250

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-07-05 (All new papers)
NEP-HRM-2008-07-05 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
NEP-MAC-2008-07-05 (Macroeconomics)

References listed on IDEAS
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Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Levine's Bibliography 618897000000000060, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003. [Downloadable!]
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Segendorff, Björn, 2000. "A Signalling Theory of Scapegoats," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 406, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . ""Who Wants a Good Reputation?''," CARESS Working Papres 98-12, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
Other versions:
- George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," Penn CARESS Working Papers a3e3219aee004bd237f8112f9, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
- George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2000. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," CARESS Working Papres sell-rep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(2), pages 415-41, April.
Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000470, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why do Politicians Delegate?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2079, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Why Do Politicians Delegate?," NBER Working Papers 11531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
repec:att:wimass:19199818 is not listed on IDEAS
Martin Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000086, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
- Martin W. Cripps & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-031, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]
- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2006. "Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000152, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2007. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 287-316, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1996. "Reputation spillover across relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 209, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

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