This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Maximising Seigniorage and Inflation Tax: The Case of Belarus

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
D r. (elect.) Julia Korosteleva
Abstract

While most Central European countries, realising the inflationary potential of money creation, had by the mid-1990s switched to market instruments based monetary policy, Belarus continued to use money emission, so gaining seigniorage and inflation tax. The productivity of the inflation tax can be analysed by comparing the revenue actually raised from inflation tax with the revenue that could be raised if the quantity of money had risen at a constant rate. The present paper, based on Cagan’s (1956) seminal work ‘Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation’, analyses the effect of inflation on seigniorage revenue in Belarus and draws conclusions about the effectiveness of monetary policy in 1995-2002, and about the consequences of inflationary financing.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_22175_en.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 2006_5.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2006_5

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/economics/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jeanette Findlay).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Hypothesis Testing
C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models
E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Younghwan In & Roberto Serrano, 2000. "Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 2000-08, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. Muthoo Abhinay, 1995. "Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 590-598, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J, 1997. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(256), pages 669-80, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2003. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining (II): unrestricted agendas," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 325-331, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 1999. "Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 956-975, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Francesca Flamini, . "First Things First? The Agenda Formation Problem for Multi-issue Committees," Working Papers 2001_19, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The yearly budget of IDEAS is exactly $0: it relies entirely on volunteer work.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.