Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2000-08.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-08

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
  2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  3. Fershtman, C., 1998. "A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1998-58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius, 1997. "A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 144-148, April.
  5. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March.
  6. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The importance of the agenda in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 224-238, September.
  7. Bac, Mehmet & Raff, Horst, 1996. "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 125-134, March.
  8. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J, 1997. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(256), pages 669-80, November.
  9. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-65, May.
  10. Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January.
  11. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
  12. Younghwan In & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining (II): Unrestricted Agendas," Departmental Working Papers, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics wp0206, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
  13. Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.
  14. Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September.
  15. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 1999. "Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 561-575.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Marx, Leslie M. & Shaffer, Greg, 2007. "Rent shifting and the order of negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1109-1125, October.
  2. Flamini, Francesca, 2007. "First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 138-157, May.
  3. Francis Bloch & Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Cores of Combined Games," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2009-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Younghwan In & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining (II): Unrestricted Agendas," Departmental Working Papers, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics wp0206, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
  5. Younghwan In, 2006. "A Note on Multi-Issue Bargaining with a Finite Set of Alternatives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 79-90, April.
  6. Alessandra Sgobbi & Carlo Carraro, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2007.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. Manfred Königstein & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2010. "Efficiency and behavioral considerations in labor negotiations," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00550466, HAL.
  8. Manfred Königstein & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00180038, HAL.
  9. Johanna Goertz, 2011. "Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 547-563, April.
  10. Rupa Chanda, 2008. "Trade in Health Services," Working Papers id:1758, eSocialSciences.
  11. Younghwan In, 2003. "A Note on Multi-Issue Bargaining with a Finite Set of Alternatives," Departmental Working Papers, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics wp0304, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
  12. Francesca Flamini, . "A Note on Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow 2003_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  13. Snyder, Christopher M. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2005. "Multiproject contact in research joint ventures: evidence and theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 459-486, December.
  14. D r. (elect.) Julia Korosteleva, . "Maximising Seigniorage and Inflation Tax: The Case of Belarus," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow 2006_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  15. Acharya, Avidit & Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2150-2163.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Brown Economics Webmaster).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.