Bargaining with Non-convexities
AbstractWe show that in the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game, a subgameperfect equilibrium exists in pure stationary strategies, even when the space of feasible payoffs is not convex. At such an equilibrium there is no delay. We also have the converse result that randomization will not be used in this environment in the sense that all stationary subgame perfect equilibria do not involve randomization on the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, mixed strategy profiles can lead to Pareto superior payoffs in non-convex cases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 042.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
operations research and management science;
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