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Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

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Author Info

  • Carlo Carraro

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca’ Foscari)

  • Carmen Marchiori

    (London School of Economics and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)

  • Alessandra Sgobbi

    (SSAV and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)

Abstract

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real-life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (e.g. climate change control). What factors determine the outcome of negotiations such as those mentioned above? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on a non-cooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, non-cooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connection among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate the progress towards a unified framework.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 2006_08.

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Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_08

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Keywords: Negotiation theory; Bragaining; Coalitions; Fairness; Agreements;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Valentina Bossetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model," OECD Economics Department Working Papers, OECD Publishing 702, OECD Publishing.
  2. Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan, 2013. "International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 13-157/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Harold Houba, 2006. "Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 06-095/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Carmen Marchiori, 2010. "Concern for Fairness and Incentives in Water Negotiations," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 553-571, April.
  5. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2009.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Andrew Brown & Robert Stern, 2005. "Concepts of Fairness in the Global Trading System," Working Papers, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan 544, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.

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