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Cores of combined games

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Author Info

  • Francis Bloch

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Geoffroy De Clippel

    (Department of Economics - Brown University)

Abstract

This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games whose core is equal to the core of the combined game. On the other hand, for non balanced games, the binary relation associating two component games whose combination has an empty core is not transitive. However, we identify a class of non balanced games which, combined with any other non balanced game, has an empty core.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00356298.

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Date of creation: Jul 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00356298

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00356298/en/
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Related research

Keywords: Cooperative games; Core; Additivity; Issue Linkage; Multi Issue Bargaining;

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References

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  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  2. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2002. "Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 423-447, August.
  3. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1981. "Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 283-286, October.
  4. Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January.
  5. LAUSSEL, Didier & LE BRETON, Michel, . "Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1519, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J, 1997. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(256), pages 669-80, November.
  7. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March.
  8. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  9. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The importance of the agenda in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 224-238, September.
  10. Bac, Mehmet & Raff, Horst, 1996. "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 125-134, March.
  11. Peters, Hans J M, 1986. "Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 153-69, January.
  12. Peters, Hans, 1985. "A note on additive utility and bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 219-222.
  13. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.
  14. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Licun Xue, 2011. "Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 880.11, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

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