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Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination

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  • Muthoo, Abhinay

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  • Muthoo, Abhinay, 1993. "Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination," Economics Discussion Papers 10021, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:10021
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    Cited by:

    1. Flamini, Francesca, 2007. "First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 138-157, May.
    2. repec:gla:glaewp:2007_23 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Leith, Campbell & von Thadden, Leopold, 2008. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 279-313, May.
    4. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2019. "Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    5. Manzini, Paola, 1999. "Strategic bargaining with destructive power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 315-322, December.
    6. Francesca Flamini, "undated". "Bargining and Investment," Working Papers 2005_6, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    7. D r. (elect.) Julia Korosteleva, "undated". "Maximising Seigniorage and Inflation Tax: The Case of Belarus," Working Papers 2006_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    8. Francesca Flamini, 2002. "Dynamic Accumulation in Bargaining Games," Working Papers 2002_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    9. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness," Working Papers 2005.66, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2008. "A repeated coalitional bargaining model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 292-298, May.
    11. Francesca Flamini, 2020. "Divide and Invest: Bargaining in a Dynamic Framework," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 121-153, November.
    12. Winter, Eyal, 1997. "Negotiations in multi-issue committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 323-342, September.
    13. Francesca Flamini, "undated". "Strategic Effects and Incentives in Multi-issue Bargaining Games," Working Papers 2005_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    14. Knabe, Andreas, 2009. "Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 161-176, March.
    15. Francesca Flamini, "undated". "A Note on Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining," Working Papers 2003_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    16. Eve-Angéline Lambert & Jean-Christian Tisserand, 2016. "Does the obligation to bargain make you fit the mould? An experimental analysis," Working Papers of BETA 2016-37, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    17. Westermark, Andreas, 2013. "Long-Term Relationship Bargaining," Working Paper Series 266, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    18. Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    19. Acharya, Avidit & Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2150-2163.
    20. Dutta, Prajit K., 2021. "Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an Evergreen Clause," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    21. Eberwein, Curtis J., 2001. "Repeated bargaining and the role of impatience and incomplete contracting," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(5), pages 573-592, December.
    22. Reinhard John & Matthias Raith, 1999. "Strategic step-by-step negotiation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 127-154, June.
    23. Stähler, Frank, 1996. "Bargaining in a long-term relationship and the Rubinstein solution," Kiel Working Papers 759, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    24. Zapal, Jan, 2018. "Patience in repeated bargaining: Revisiting Muthoo (1999)," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 150-153.

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