A Model of Bargaining with the Possibility of Arbitration
AbstractWe consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator - who can only become active with the consent of both parties - in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We discuss the implications of this result both for theories of arbitration and for the interpretation of cooperative bargainining solutions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9710001.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 01 Oct 1997
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Note: Type of Document - ScientificWord2.5; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP; pages: 36; figures: included
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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