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Negotiating Constitution for Political Unions

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  • Vikas Kumar

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Abstract

This paper provides a cradle-to-grave model for political union between two unequally endowed states. The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the role of technology gap and unequal distribution of resources in all the above cases.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:1797.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1797

Note: Institutional Papers
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Related research

Keywords: Bargaining; Constitution; Contest; Political Union; technology; resources; states; distribution; historical cycles; political geography; negotiating; dependence;

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  1. Ludwig van den Hauwe, 2005. "Constitutional economics," Public Economics 0508010, EconWPA, revised 19 Aug 2005.
  2. Anbarci, N. & Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms Against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Papers 00-01-19, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  3. Friedman, David, 1977. "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 59-77, February.
  4. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  5. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February.
  6. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Working Papers 060705, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  7. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
  8. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-65, May.
  9. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2008. "Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa," NBER Working Papers 13733, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
  11. Chang Roberto, 1995. "Bargaining a Monetary Union," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 89-112, June.
  12. Herschel Grossman, 2002. "Constitution or Conflict?," Working Papers 2002-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  13. Chaim Fershtman, 1986. "The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining," Discussion Papers 689, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 1999. "Optimal secession rules," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-51, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  15. Albert Breton, 1964. "The Economics of Nationalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72, pages 376.
  16. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521855266 is not listed on IDEAS
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