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Political Party Negotiations, Income Distribution and Endogenous Growth

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  • Chang, R.

Abstract

This paper examines the determination of the rate of growth in an economy in which two political parties, each representing a different social class, negotiate the magnitude and allocation of taxes. Taxes may increase growth if they finance public services but reduce growth when used to redistribute income between classes. The different social classes have different preferences about growth and redistribution. The resulting conflict is resolved through the tax negotiations between the political parties. I use the model to obtain empirical predictions and policy lessons about the relationship between economic growth and income inequality. The model is consistent with the observation that differences in growth rates across countries are negatively related to income inequality. However, government policy cannot simultaneously increase growth and reduce inequality.

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9391/RR92-39.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 92-39.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:92-39

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
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Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Related research

Keywords: economic growth ; political parties;

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References

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  1. Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 2088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1996. " Social Conflict and Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 125-42, March.
  3. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
  4. Tornell, Aaron, 1997. " Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 219-50, September.
  5. Galor, Oded & Zeira, Joseph, 1988. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," MPRA Paper 51644, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Sep 1989.
  6. Robert J. Barro, 2013. "Inflation and Economic Growth," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(1), pages 121-144, May.
  7. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  8. Barro, Robert J, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 407-43, May.
  9. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Growth, distribution and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 593-602, April.
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  18. Rodrik, Dani & Alesina, Alberto, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," Scholarly Articles 4551798, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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  20. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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  22. Greenwood, J. & Jovanovic, B., 1990. "Financial Development, Growth, And The Distribution Of Income," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9002, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
  23. Chang Roberto, 1995. "Bargaining a Monetary Union," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 89-112, June.
  24. Perotti, Roberto, 1992. "Income Distribution, Politics, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 311-16, May.
  25. Clarke, George R. G., 1992. "More evidence on income distribution and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1064, The World Bank.
  26. Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct.
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  28. Perotti, Roberto, 1993. "Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution, and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 755-76, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ugo Panizza, 1999. "Income Inequality and Economic Growth: Evidence from the American Data," Research Department Publications 4178, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  2. Ugo Panizza, 1999. "Desigualdad del ingreso y crecimiento económico: elementos de juicio de datos de USA," Research Department Publications 4179, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  3. Bingqin Li & David Piachaud, 2004. "Poverty and Inequality and Social Policy in China," CASE Papers 087, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.
  4. Bingqin Li & David Piachaud, 2004. "Poverty and inequality and social policy in China," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6303, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2001. "Theory and Evidence on the Political Economy of Growth," Working Papers 33, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2001.
  6. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March.
  7. Paul J. Zak, 2002. "Institutions, Property Rights, and Growth," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 68(1), pages 55-73.
  8. Theo Eicher & Stephen Turnovsky & Maria Carme Riera i Prunera, 2002. "Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications," Working Papers in Economics 82, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  9. Benos, Nikos, 2009. "Fiscal policy and economic growth: empirical evidence from EU countries," MPRA Paper 19174, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Tselios, Vassilis, 2008. "Inequalities in Income and Education and Regional Economic Growth in Western Europe," Papers DYNREG34, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
  11. Paul J. ZAK, 2002. "Institutions, Property Rights and Growth," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2002014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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