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Optimal secession rules

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Author Info
Bordignon, Massimo
Brusco, Sandro

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 45 (2001)
Issue (Month): 10 (December)
Pages: 1811-1834
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:45:y:2001:i:10:p:1811-1834

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 115-21, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lockwood, Ben, 1999. "Inter-regional insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-37, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2002. "Local public goods, inter-regional transfers and private information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 329-356, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1987. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1023-31, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bordignon, Massimo & Manasse, Paolo & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Optimal Regional Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 1437, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-56, November.
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  10. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 1997. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," NBER Working Papers 6163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1995. "Togetheror separately? Issues on the costs and benefits of political and fiscal unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 751-758, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase," CEPR Discussion Papers 4188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession," IDEI Working Papers 164, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  3. Herschel I. Grossman, 2003. ". . . and six hundred thousand men were dead," NBER Working Papers 9793, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 2002. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne. [Downloadable!]
  5. Essi Eerola & Niku Määttänen & Panu Poutvaara, 2004. "Citizens Should Vote on Secession," Discussion Papers 939, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Enrico Spolaore, 2008. "Civil conflict and secessions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 45-63, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Kjell Hausken & John F. Knutsen, 2002. "The Birth, Adjustment and Death of States," Public Economics 0205004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2001. "The art of making everybody happy: how to prevent a secession," CORE Discussion Papers 2001011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  9. Shlomo Weber & Michel Le Breton, 2001. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Working Papers 01/176, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. Antonio Nicolo' & Piero Tedeschi, 2004. "Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of not Signing a Prenuptial Agreement," Game Theory and Information 0406001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Erik Berglöf & Mike Burkart & Guido Friebel & Elena Paltseva, 2009. "Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity," EPRU Working Paper Series 2009-07, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Klaas Staal, 2004. "Country Size and Public Good Provision," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-026/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  13. Kjell Hausken & John F. Knutsen, 2004. "An Enabling Mechanism for the Creation, Adjustment, and Dissolution of States and Governmental Units," Public Economics 0409011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Berglöf, Erik & Burkart, Mike & Friebel, Guido & Paltseva, Elena, 2008. "Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 6672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Stegarescu, Dan, 2004. "Economic Integration and Fiscal Decentralization : Evidence from OECD Countries," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-86, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  16. K Staal, 2004. "Country size and public good provision," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 156, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  17. Gregoire Rota Graziosi, 2003. "The theory of `Internal Exit', a comment on Buchanan and Faith (1987)," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(12), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Klaas Staal, 2006. "Country size and publicly provided goods," Discussion Papers 187, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  20. Stefano Comino & Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2005. "Termination Clauses in Partnerships," Industrial Organization 0509007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Martin Kolmar, 2003. "Income Redistribution in an Economic Union: Does Asymmetric Information Legitimize Centralization?," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 169-186, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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