The Theory of `Internal Exit', a comment on Buchanan and Faith (1987)
AbstractThe purpose of this note is to correct an error in the seminal article on secession by Buchanan and Faith (1987). In their paper, Buchanan and Faith neglected an important effect: political separation affects markets and consequently individual private incomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CERDI in its series Working Papers with number 200630.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
secession; public good.;
Other versions of this item:
- Gregoire Rota Graziosi, 2003. "The theory of `Internal Exit', a comment on Buchanan and Faith (1987)," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(12), pages 1-6.
- GrÃ©goire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "The Theory of `Internal Exit', a comment on Buchanan and Faith (1987)," Working Papers halshs-00557218, HAL.
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
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- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2006. "On the strategic use of representative democracy in international agreements," Working Papers 200624, CERDI.
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