Unequal Provision of Local Public Services under the Threat of Secession
AbstractThis paper studies to what extent it is possible to discriminate between two municipality parts by unequal public service provision when there is a threat of secession. The objective of the local politicians is to maximize utility for only one part of a municipality. The discriminated part is small and politically marginalized, but has the option to secede. The power of the small part's population is in this way entirely exercised through the threat of secession. It becomes their guarantee against being taxed too heavily or against obtaining too little of public services. The case of three recent secession attempts in Göteborg, Sweden, is discussed in light of the model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 103.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 05 Sep 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
More information through EDIRC
secession; local public services;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other
- H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-GEO-2003-09-24 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-PBE-2003-09-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2003-09-24 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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