Constitutional economics II
AbstractThis paper is the sequel to chapter 7 (Constitutional economics) of the 1999 first edition of The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (ed. J. Backhaus).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0508009.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 17 Aug 2005
Date of revision: 19 Aug 2005
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 16.
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Law and Economics; Constitutional Economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
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- Russell Sobel, 1994. "The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 173-192, March.
- Donald Boudreaux & A. Pritchard, 1994. "Reassessing the role of the independent judiciary in enforcing interest-group bargains," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-21, December.
- Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 303-328, September.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Vanberg, Viktor J., 2004. "Market and State: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 04/10, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
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