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Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?

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Author Info
Pierre von Mouche (Wageningen Universiteit)
Henk Folmer (Wageningen Universiteit and Rijksuniversiteit Groning)

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Abstract

Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2007.60.

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Date of creation: May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.60

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Related research
Keywords: Environmental Policy; Linking; Folk Theorem; Tensor Game; Prsioners' Dilemma; Full Cooperation; Pareto Efficiency; Minkowski Sum; Vector Maximum; Convex Analysis;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1996. "The Folk Theorems For Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Working Papers 96-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9601001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Jean-Pierre BenoƮt & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers 96-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Benoit, J.P. & Krishna, V., 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Papers 1-96-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
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