Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?
AbstractLinking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2007.60.
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Environmental Policy; Linking; Folk Theorem; Tensor Game; Prsioners' Dilemma; Full Cooperation; Pareto Efficiency; Minkowski Sum; Vector Maximum; Convex Analysis;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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