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North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

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  • A. Caparrós

    ()

  • J.-C. Péreau

    ()

  • T. Tazdaït

    ()

Abstract

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-004-2683-x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 121 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (February)
Pages: 455-480

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:3:p:455-480

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1985. "A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1151-72, September.
  2. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  4. Rotillon, Gilles & Tazdait, Tarik & Zeghni, Sylvain, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 177-187, August.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  6. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
  8. Yukihiko Funaki & Takehiko Yamato, 1999. "The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 157-171.
  9. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  10. Carsten Helm, 2001. "On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 141-146.
  11. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  12. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Jon Hovi, 2001. "Decentralized Enforcement, Sequential Bargaining and the Clean Development Mechanism," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, pages 135-152.
  14. Henry Van Egteren & Jianmin Tang, 1997. "Maxium Victim Benefit: A Fair Division Process in Transboundary Pollution Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(4), pages 363-386, December.
  15. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Margrethe Aanesen, 2012. "Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 105(2), pages 145-160, March.
  2. repec:old:wpaper:336-11 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013. "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
  4. Michael Finus & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013. "Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 211-226, October.
  5. Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2011. "International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities," Working Papers V-336-11, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
  6. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink & Ekko Ierland, 2010. "Renegotiations in the Greenhouse," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 573-596, April.
  7. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2012. "Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 565-584, June.

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