The theory of repeated games occupies a central place in noncooperative game theory as it forms a relatively simple platform from which to study dynamic aspects of strategic interaction. In this paper we attempt a synthesis of the various folk theorems by adpting a point of view which de-emphasizes the choice of horizon.
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Paper provided by Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
1-96-3.
Length: 33 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:1-96-3
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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