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Applications of negotiation theory to water issues

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Author Info
Carlo Carraro () (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca’ Foscari)
Carmen Marchiori (London School of Economics and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)
Alessandra Sgobbi (SSAV and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)

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Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that of, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006_09Classification-JEL: C72, C78.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_09

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Related research
Keywords: Negotiation theory Bragaining Coalitions Fairness Agreements

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Catarina Roseta-Palma & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2004. "Robust Control in Water Management," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 21-34, 07. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dinar, Ariel & Rosegrant, Mark W. & Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, 1997. "Water allocation mechanisms : principles and examples," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1779, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Putnam, Robert D, 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-60, Summer.
  5. D. Kilgour & Ariel Dinar, 2001. "Flexible Water Sharing within an International River Basin," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 43-60, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kilgour, D. Marc & Dinar, Ariel, 1995. "Are stable agreements for sharing international river waters now possible?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1474, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Booker J. F. & Young R. A., 1994. "Modeling Intrastate and Interstate Markets for Colorado River Water Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 66-87, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Adams, Gregory & Rausser, Gordon & Simon, Leo, 1996. "Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 97-111, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Sophie Thoyer & Sylvie Morardet & Patrick Rio & Leo Simon & Rachel Goodhue & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "A Bargaining Model to Simulate Negotiations Between Water Users," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4. [Downloadable!]
  12. Tsur Yacov & Zemel Amos, 1995. "Uncertainty and Irreversibility in Groundwater Resource Management," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 149-161, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Provencher Bill & Burt Oscar, 1993. "The Externalities Associated with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 139-158, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alessandra Sgobbi & Carlo Carraro, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2007.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Harold Houba, . "Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-095/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2007. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Working Papers 2007.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Janmaat, Johannus A., 2007. "Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort?," MPRA Paper 6147, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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