IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/3641.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Applications of negotiation theory to water issues

Author

Listed:
  • Carraro, Carlo
  • Marchiori, Carmen
  • Sgobbi, Alessandra

Abstract

The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to waterrelated issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the"rules of the game"that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource.

Suggested Citation

  • Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005. "Applications of negotiation theory to water issues," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3641, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3641
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/06/16/000016406_20050616101620/Rendered/PDF/wps3641.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    3. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L., 1990. "Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers Archive 819, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Tsur, Yacov & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore, 1991. "The buffer value of groundwater with stochastic surface water supplies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 201-224, November.
    5. Crow, Ben & Singh, Nirvikar, 2000. "Impediments and Innovation in International Rivers: The Waters of South Asia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 1907-1925, November.
    6. Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, December.
    7. Adams, Gregory & Rausser, Gordon & Simon, Leo, 1996. "Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 97-111, July.
    8. Dinar, Ariel & Rosegrant, Mark W. & Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, 1997. "Water allocation mechanisms : principles and examples," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1779, The World Bank.
    9. Roseta-Palma, Catarina, 2002. "Groundwater Management When Water Quality Is Endogenous," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 93-105, July.
    10. Kilgour, D. Marc & Dinar, Ariel, 1995. "Are stable agreements for sharing international river waters now possible?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1474, The World Bank.
    11. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    12. D. Kilgour & Ariel Dinar, 2001. "Flexible Water Sharing within an International River Basin," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(1), pages 43-60, January.
    13. Simon, Leo K. & Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Thoyer, Sophie & Morardet, Sylvie & Rio, Patrick, 2007. "Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy," Monographs, University of California, Davis, Giannini Foundation, number 37630, December.
    14. Tsur Yacov & Zemel Amos, 1995. "Uncertainty and Irreversibility in Groundwater Resource Management," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 149-161, September.
    15. Nick Hanley & Henk Folmer (ed.), 1998. "Game Theory and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1083.
    16. Sophie Thoyer & Sylvie Morardet & Patrick Rio & Leo Simon & Rachael Goodhue & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "A Bargaining Model to Simulate Negotiations Between Water Users," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4(2), pages 1-6.
    17. M. Tidball & J.B. Krawczyk, 2003. "An Intertemporal Competition Model for Water Levels," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 145, Society for Computational Economics.
    18. Petr Šauer & Antonín Dvořák & Aleš Lisa & Petr Fiala, 2003. "A Procedure for Negotiating Pollution Reduction under Information Asymmetry. Surface Water Quality Case," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 24(2), pages 103-119, February.
    19. Bill Provencher & Oscar Burt, 1994. "A Private Property Rights Regime for the Commons: The Case for Groundwater," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(4), pages 875-888.
    20. Olivier Barreteau & Patrice Garin & Alexandre Dumontier & Geraldine Abrami & Flavie Cernesson, 2003. "Agent-Based Facilitation of Water Allocation: Case Study in the Drome River Valley," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 12(5), pages 441-461, September.
    21. Booker J. F. & Young R. A., 1994. "Modeling Intrastate and Interstate Markets for Colorado River Water Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 66-87, January.
    22. Provencher Bill & Burt Oscar, 1993. "The Externalities Associated with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 139-158, March.
    23. Clyde Holsapple & Hsiangchu Lai & Andrew Whinston, 1997. "Implications of Negotiation Theory for Research and Development of Negotiation Support Systems," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 255-274, May.
    24. Catarina Roseta-Palma & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2004. "Robust Control in Water Management," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 21-34, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dinar, Ariel & Farolfi, Stefano & Patrone, Fioravante & Rowntree, Kate, 2006. "TO NEGOTIATE OR TO GAME THEORIZE: Negotiation vs. Game Theory Outcomes for Water Allocation Problems in the Kat Basin, South Africa," Working Papers 60888, University of Pretoria, Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development.
    2. Bhaduri, Anik & Perez, Nicostrato D. & Liebe, Jens, 2008. "Scope and Sustainability of Cooperation in Transboundary Water Sharing of the Volta River," Discussion Papers 43324, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    3. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2012. "Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 388-403.
    4. Harold Houba, 2008. "Computing Alternating Offers And Water Prices In Bilateral River Basin Management," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 257-278.
    5. Antoine Soubeyran & Agnes Tomini, 2012. "Water Shortages and Conflict," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 279-297.
    6. Grundel, S. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2011. "A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games : Multipurpose Resource Allocation," Other publications TiSEM b1926d6b-22f4-4f28-84a2-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Soesja Grundel & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2019. "Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 27(1), pages 37-54, April.
    8. Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2008. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 249-266, October.
    9. Soesja Grundel & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2013. "Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(2), pages 149-169, October.
    10. Zareena Begum Irfan & Jeeva Mary Jacob, 2016. "Game Theoretical Approach to Regulate the Public-Owned River Water Utilities: A case study of Cauvery River," Working Papers 2016-142, Madras School of Economics,Chennai,India.
    11. Zareena Begum Irfan & Jeeva Mary Jacob, 2016. "Game Theoretical Approach to Regulate the Public-Owned River Water Utilities: A Case Study of Cauvery River," Working Papers id:10746, eSocialSciences.
    12. Fabio Zagonari, 2010. "Sustainable, Just, Equal, and Optimal Groundwater Management Strategies to Cope with Climate Change: Insights from Brazil," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(13), pages 3731-3756, October.
    13. Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu & Weijun He & Liang Yuan, 2017. "Monotonic Bargaining Solution for Allocating Critically Scarce Transboundary Water," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 31(9), pages 2627-2644, July.
    14. Harold Houba & Gerard Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 855-872, December.
    15. Meraj Sohrabi & Zeynab Banoo Ahani Amineh & Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan & Hossein Zanjanian, 2023. "A framework for optimal water allocation considering water value, strategic management and conflict resolution," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 1582-1613, February.
    16. Peter Egger & Christoph Jeßberger & Mario Larch, 2011. "Trade and investment liberalization as determinants of multilateral environmental agreement membership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(6), pages 605-633, December.
    17. Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars, 2008. "Sharing a river among satiable agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-50, September.
    18. Christoph Jeßberger, 2011. "Multilateral Environmental Agreements up to 2050: Are They Sustainable Enough?," ifo Working Paper Series 98, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    19. Soltani, Arezoo & Sankhayan, Prem Lall & Hofstad, Ole, 2016. "Playing forest governance games: State-village conflict in Iran," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 251-261.
    20. Alban Thomas & Vera Zaporozhets, 2017. "Bargaining Over Environmental Budgets: A Political Economy Model with Application to French Water Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(2), pages 227-248, October.
    21. Janmaat, John, 2008. "Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 455-473, August.
    22. Carraro, Carlo & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 6424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Janmaat, Johannus A., 2007. "Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort?," MPRA Paper 6147, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sgobbi, Alessandra & Carraro, Carlo, 2011. "A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 1(2), pages 119-150, April.
    2. Phoebe Koundouri, 2004. "Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(5), pages 703-740, December.
    3. Carraro, Carlo & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 6424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Fabio Zagonari, 2010. "Sustainable, Just, Equal, and Optimal Groundwater Management Strategies to Cope with Climate Change: Insights from Brazil," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(13), pages 3731-3756, October.
    5. Harold Houba, 2008. "Computing Alternating Offers And Water Prices In Bilateral River Basin Management," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 257-278.
    6. Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2008. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 249-266, October.
    7. Marita Laukkanen & Phoebe Koundouri, 2006. "Competition versus coopertion in groundwater extraction: A stochastic framework with heteregoneous agents," DEOS Working Papers 0606, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    8. James Roumasset & Christopher Wada, 2012. "The Economics of Groundwater," Working Papers 201211, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    9. Amine Chekireb & Julio Goncalves & Hubert Stahn & Agnes Tomini, 2021. "Private exploitation of the North-Western Sahara Aquifer System," Working Papers halshs-03457972, HAL.
    10. Meraj Sohrabi & Zeynab Banoo Ahani Amineh & Mohammad Hossein Niksokhan & Hossein Zanjanian, 2023. "A framework for optimal water allocation considering water value, strategic management and conflict resolution," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 1582-1613, February.
    11. Cabo, Francisco & Erdlenbruch, Katrin & Tidball, Mabel, 2014. "Dynamic management of water transfer between two interconnected river basins," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 17-38.
    12. Simon, Leo K. & Thoyer, Sophie & Morardet, Sylvie & Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rio, Patrick & Rausser, Gordon C., 2003. "Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations: Application to water management policies in France," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58258, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    13. Tyagi, Ashish & Shortle, James S., 2016. "Modeling Endogenous Change in Water Allocation Mechanisms: A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Approach," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235571, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    14. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
    15. Christopher K. Butler, 2004. "Modeling Compromise at the International Table," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(3), pages 159-177, July.
    16. Brozovic, Nicholas & Sunding, David L. & Zilberman, David, 2004. "Measuring The Gains From Management Of Spatially Heterogeneous Resources: The Case Of Groundwater," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20240, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    17. Santiago J. Rubio Jorge & Begoña Casino, 1997. "Strategic behavior and efficiency in a groundwater pumping differential game," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    18. Santiago J. Rubio & Juan P. Castro, 1996. "Long-run groundwater reserves under uncertainty," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(1), pages 71-88, January.
    19. repec:hae:wpaper:2012-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Eleni Kampragou & Eleni Eleftheriadou & Yannis Mylopoulos, 2007. "Implementing Equitable Water Allocation in Transboundary Catchments: The Case of River Nestos/Mesta," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 21(5), pages 909-918, May.
    21. Eirik S. Amundsen & Frank Jensen, 2016. "Drought and Groundwater Management," IFRO Working Paper 2016/04, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions; Town Water Supply and Sanitation; Water and Industry; Environmental Economics&Policies; Water Conservation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3641. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.