This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jean-Pierre Benoit (NYU)
Vijay Krishna (Penn State)
Abstract

We present a synthesis of various folk theorems for repeated games.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9601/9601001.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9601/9601001.tex
File Format: application/x-tex
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9601/9601001.ps.gz
File Format: application/postscript
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9601001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 17 Jan 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9601001

Note: 33 pages, LaTeX file created using Scientific Workplace 2.01
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Wen, Quan, 1994. "The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 949-54, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Smith, Lones, 1992. "Folk theorems in overlapping generations games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 426-449, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Smith, Lones, 1995. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 425-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Gossner, Olivier, 1995. "The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 95-107.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Sorin, S., 1988. "Repeated Games With Complete Information," Papers 8822, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
    Other versions:
  12. Cremer, Jacques, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Pierre von Mouche & Henk Folmer, 2007. "Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements?," Working Papers 2007.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.