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The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jean-Pierre Benoit (NYU)
Vijay Krishna (Penn State)
We present a synthesis of various folk theorems for repeated games.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number
9601001.
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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 17 Jan 1996Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9601001Note: 33 pages, LaTeX file created using Scientific Workplace 2.01Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).
Keywords: Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Bernheim B. Douglas & Dasgupta Aniruddha, 1995.
"Repeated Games with Asymptotically Finite Horizons ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Smith, Lones, 1992.
"Folk theorems in overlapping generations games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sorin, Sylvain, 1992.
"Repeated games with complete information ,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications ,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gossner, Olivier, 1995.
"The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 95-107.
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991.
"Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cremer, Jacques, 1986.
"Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987.
"On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games ,"
Working papers
467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Other versions: Wen, Quan, 1994.
"The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 949-54, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Smith, Lones, 1995.
"Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 425-30, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Smith, L., 1993.
"Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem ,"
Working papers
93-6, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Smith, L., 1994.
"Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem ,"
Working papers
94-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985.
"Finitely Repeated Games ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kandori, Michihiro, 1992.
"Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986.
"The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Pierre von Mouche & Henk Folmer, 2007.
"Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements? ,"
Working Papers
2007.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!]
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