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Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation

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Author Info
Conconi, Paola
Sahuguet, Nicolas

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of policy-makers' horizons on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived organizations (countries) run by agents (policy-makers) with a shorter tenure. The agents' mandates are finite but potentially renewable and staggered across different organizations. We show that the efficient cooperative equilibrium is only sustainable when policy-makers are re-electable. Moreover, re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policy-makers with renewable mandates than between policy-makers who are automatically re-elected. However, if the chances of re-election depend significantly on recent performance, policy-makers will collude to get re-elected. In this case, term limits may help to sustain international cooperation.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5401.

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Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5401

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Related research
Keywords: overlapping generations re-election incentives self-enforcing cooperation

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F0 - International Economics - - General

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  5. Bhaskar, V, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 135-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Josh Ederington, 2001. "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1580-1593, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Daniel Eisenberg & Jonathan Ketcham, 2004. "Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections: Who Blames Whom for What," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1285-1285. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1999. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9902001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Gowa, Joanne, 1998. "Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 52(2), pages 307-24, Spring.
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  21. Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 190-214, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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