Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Luca Anderlini
  • Dino Gerardi
  • Roger Lagunoff

Abstract

We analyze “dynastic” repeated games. A stage game is repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. Each individual has preferences that replicate those of the infinitely-lived players of a standard discounted infinitely-repeated game. When all players observe the past history of play, the standard repeated game and the dynastic game are equivalent In our model all players live one period and do not observe the history of play that takes place before their birth, but instead receive a private message from their immediate predecessors. Under very mild conditions, when players are sufficiently patient, all feasible payoff vectors (including those below the minmax of the stage game) can be sustained as a Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game with private communication. The result applies to any stage game for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoff set with a non-empty interior. We are also able to characterize entirely when a Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoff vector not sustainable as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the standard repeated game. For this to be the case it must be that the players’ equilibrium beliefs violate a condition that we term “Inter-Generational Agreement.” Classification-JEL Codes: C72, C73, D82

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/folktheorem.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 784828000000000664.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 31 Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000664

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Salant, David J., 1991. "A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 244-259, May.
  2. Anderlini, Luca & Gerardi, Dino & Lagunoff, Roger, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Working Papers, Yale University, Department of Economics 37, Yale University, Department of Economics.
  3. Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt4968n3fz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
  5. Wallace, Neil, 2001. "Whither Monetary Economics?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 847-69, November.
  6. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
  8. Andrew Schotter & Barry Sopher, 2003. "Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 498-529, June.
  9. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
  10. Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' ," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0107001, EconWPA.
  11. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000577, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
  13. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
  14. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, October.
  15. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics gueconwpa~07-07-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  16. Hajime Kobayashi, 2007. "Folk Theorems For Infinitely Repeated Games Played By Organizations With Short-Lived Members," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 517-549, 05.
  17. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000664, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
  19. Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9485, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  20. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2001. "Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics 1, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  21. Cremer, Jacques, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February.
  22. Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 892R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  23. James Bergin, 2006. "The folk theorem revisited," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 321-332, January.
  24. D. Aliprantis, C. & Camera, G. & Puzzello, D., 2007. "Anonymous markets and monetary trading," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 1905-1928, October.
  25. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  26. Charalambos D Aliprantis & Gabriele Camera & Daniela Puzzello, 2007. "Contagion Equilibria in a Monetary Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 277-282, 01.
  27. Schotter, Andrew & Sopher, Barry, 2007. "Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 365-393, February.
  28. Smith, Lones, 1992. "Folk theorems in overlapping generations games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 426-449, July.
  29. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  30. Dean Corbae & Ted Temzelides & Randall Wright, 2002. "Matching and Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 67-71, May.
  31. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Money is memory," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 218, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  32. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
  33. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 631, David K. Levine.
  34. Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 162, David K. Levine.
  35. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2010. "Dismissals and quits in repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 67-80, April.
  3. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
  4. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2011. "History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms," NBER Working Papers 17066, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000664. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.