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Personal Details

First Name: Roger
Middle Name:
Last Name: Lagunoff
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pla16

Email:
Homepage: http://www.georgetown.edu/lagunoff/lagunoff.htm
Postal Address:
Phone:

Affiliation

• Economics Department
  Georgetown University
  Location: Washington, District of Columbia (United States)
  Homepage: http://econ.georgetown.edu/
  Email:
  Phone: 202-687-5601
  Fax: 202-687-6102
  Postal: ICC 580, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057-1036
  Handle: RePEc:edi:edgeous (more details at EDIRC)

Works

Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML (with abstracts), plain text (with abstracts), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

1. Jinhui Bai and Roger Lagunoff, 2010. "Revealed Political Power," Working Papers gueconwpa~10-10-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
   • Jinhui H. Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2010. "Revealed Political Power," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000106, David K. Levine.
2. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001868, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 82, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2010.
   • Roger Lagunoff & Dino Gerardi & Luca Anderlini, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1639, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Anderlini, Luca & Gerardi, Dino & Lagunoff, Roger, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Working Papers 37, Yale University, Department of Economics.
3. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.
4. Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001627, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Roger Lagunoff, 2011. "On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 17-48.
   • Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-02, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
5. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1601, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics.
6. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000664, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
7. Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000051, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Lagunoff, Roger, 2009. "Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 569-583, November.
   • Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0505006, EconWPA.
8. William Jack (Georgetown University) and Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2005. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-15, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
   • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 703-725, December.
   • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000534, UCLA Department of Economics.
9. Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0501003, EconWPA.
   • Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000876, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2005. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
10. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0410001, EconWPA.
    • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000577, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
11. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 47, Econometric Society.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
12. Andrew Feltenstein & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-08, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    • Feltenstein, Andrew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2005. "International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 73-96, September.
    • Roger Dean Lagunoff & Andrew Feltenstein, 2003. "International Versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," IMF Working Papers 03/190, International Monetary Fund.
    • Andrew Feltenstein & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," Macroeconomics 0308002, EconWPA.
13. Haag, Matthew & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 97, Royal Economic Society.
    • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July.
    • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 650, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers 2003.54, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Wallis Working Papers WP33, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2010. "On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000043, David K. Levine.
    • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Game Theory and Information 0209005, EconWPA.
14. William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Jack, William & Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Dynamic enfranchisement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 551-572, May.
    • Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," 2004 Meeting Papers 466, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Public Economics 0306002, EconWPA, revised 01 Jul 2003.
    • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Wallis Working Papers WP36, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    • Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 24, Econometric Society.
    • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfrachisement," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
15. Roger Lagunoff & Matthew Haag, 2002. "One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
16. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(4), pages A0.
    • Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Game Theory and Information 0203003, EconWPA.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
17. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2001. "Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism," Game Theory and Information 0103002, EconWPA.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2004. "Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 383-411, 04.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2001. "Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism," Working Papers 1, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
18. Arik Levinson, 2001. "Energy Use By Apartment Tenants When Landlords Pay For Utilities," Working Papers gueconwpa~01-01-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    • Levinson, Arik & Niemann, Scott, 2004. "Energy use by apartment tenants when landlords pay for utilities," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-75, March.
19. Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' ," Game Theory and Information 0107001, EconWPA.
    • Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 265-299, 08.
    • Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups," Working Papers gueconwpa~01-01-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2001.
20. Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2049, David K. Levine.
    • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, And Neighborhood Planning ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 265-296, 02.
    • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning," Game Theory and Information 9907004, EconWPA.
21. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2000. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0894, Econometric Society.
    • Akihiko Matsui & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric?," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 397-412.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?," Game Theory and Information 9906001, EconWPA, revised 03 Jun 1999.
22. Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Game Theory and Information 9901003, EconWPA, revised 03 Jun 1999.
    • Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1231-1248, September.
23. Roger D. Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1999. "Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance," Research Working Paper 99-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    • Lagunoff, Roger & Schreft, Stacey L, 1999. "Financial Fragility with Rational And Irrational Exuberance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 531-60, August.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1999. "Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 531-567.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1999. "Financial Fragility with Rational and Irrational Exuberance," Macroeconomics 9904011, EconWPA.
24. Gerhard Glomm & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary versus Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information 9901002, EconWPA.
25. Roger D. Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1998. "A model of financial fragility," Research Working Paper 98-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    • Lagunoff, Roger & Schreft, Stacey L., 2001. "A Model of Financial Fragility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 220-264, July.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1998. "A Model of Financial Fragility," Game Theory and Information 9803001, EconWPA, revised 30 Apr 1998.
26. Roger Lagunoff, 1997. "A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty," Game Theory and Information 9707004, EconWPA.
    • Lagunoff, Roger, 2001. "A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 109-32, January.
27. Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997. "On the Social Stability of Coalitional Property Rights Regimes," Game Theory and Information 9707007, EconWPA.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1999. "On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 409-427.
28. Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997. "A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods," Game Theory and Information 9707008, EconWPA.
    • Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger, 1998. "A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 91-112, April.
29. Roger Lagunoff & Hans Haller, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Game Theory and Information 9707006, EconWPA.
    • Haller, Hans & Lagunoff, Roger, 2010. "Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1103-1114, November.
    • Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000560, UCLA Department of Economics.
30. Roger Lagunoff, 1997. "On the Evolution of Pereto Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information 9707003, EconWPA.
    • Lagunoff, Roger, 2000. "On the Evolution of Pareto-Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 273-93, May.
31. Roger Lagunoff, 1995. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 100, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
32. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, . ""An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games''," CARESS Working Papres 95-15, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
33. Roger D. Lagunoff, . ""Sufficiently Specialized Economies have Nonempty Cores''," CARESS Working Papres 95-07, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 1997. "Sufficiently Specialized Economies Have Nonempty Cores," Game Theory and Information 9707005, EconWPA.
34. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsu, . "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Penn CARESS Working Papers 23a1aa461811b8f48b0334f6e, Penn Economics Department.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1467-1478, November.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsu, . ""Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games''," CARESS Working Papres 96-10, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information 9707002, EconWPA.

Articles

1. Roger Lagunoff, 2011. "On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 17-48.
   • Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001627, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "On the 'Faustian' Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Working Papers gueconwpa~08-08-02, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
2. Haller, Hans & Lagunoff, Roger, 2010. "Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1103-1114, November.
   • Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000560, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Roger Lagunoff & Hans Haller, 1997. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Game Theory and Information 9707006, EconWPA.
3. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2010. "Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(3), pages 559-574, July.
4. Lagunoff, Roger, 2009. "Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 569-583, November.
   • Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0505006, EconWPA.
   • Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000051, UCLA Department of Economics.
5. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
   • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000664, UCLA Department of Economics.
6. Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July.
   • Haag, Matthew & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 97, Royal Economic Society.
   • Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 650, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers 2003.54, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Wallis Working Papers WP33, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2010. "On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000043, David K. Levine.
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Game Theory and Information 0209005, EconWPA.
7. William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 703-725, December.
   • William Jack (Georgetown University) and Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2005. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-15, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
   • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000534, UCLA Department of Economics.
8. Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, And Neighborhood Planning ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 265-296, 02.
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2049, David K. Levine.
   • Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning," Game Theory and Information 9907004, EconWPA.
9. Jack, William & Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Dynamic enfranchisement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 551-572, May.
   • Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," 2004 Meeting Papers 466, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Public Economics 0306002, EconWPA, revised 01 Jul 2003.
   • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Wallis Working Papers WP36, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
   • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Roger Lagunoff & William Jack, 2004. "Dynamic Enfranchisement," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 24, Econometric Society.
   • William Jack & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "Dynamic Enfrachisement," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
10. Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 59-86, January.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible communication in dynastic government," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(4), pages A0.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Game Theory and Information 0203003, EconWPA.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
11. Feltenstein, Andrew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2005. "International versus domestic auditing of bank solvency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 73-96, September.
    • Andrew Feltenstein & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-08, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    • Roger Dean Lagunoff & Andrew Feltenstein, 2003. "International Versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," IMF Working Papers 03/190, International Monetary Fund.
    • Andrew Feltenstein & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "International versus Domestic Auditing of Bank Solvency," Macroeconomics 0308002, EconWPA.
12. Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 265-299, 08.
    • Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups," Working Papers gueconwpa~01-01-03, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2001.
    • Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' ," Game Theory and Information 0107001, EconWPA.
13. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2004. "Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 383-411, 04.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2001. "Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism," Working Papers 1, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2001. "Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism," Game Theory and Information 0103002, EconWPA.
14. Lagunoff, Roger, 2001. "A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 109-32, January.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 1997. "A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty," Game Theory and Information 9707004, EconWPA.
15. Roger Lagunoff & Luca Anderlini, 2001. "NSF conference on decentralization," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(64), pages A0.
16. Akihiko Matsui & Roger Lagunoff, 2001. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated games nongeneric?," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 397-412.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?," Game Theory and Information 9906001, EconWPA, revised 03 Jun 1999.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 2000. "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0894, Econometric Society.
17. Lagunoff, Roger & Schreft, Stacey L., 2001. "A Model of Financial Fragility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 220-264, July.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1998. "A Model of Financial Fragility," Game Theory and Information 9803001, EconWPA, revised 30 Apr 1998.
    • Roger D. Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1998. "A model of financial fragility," Research Working Paper 98-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
18. Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1231-1248, September.
    • Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Game Theory and Information 9901003, EconWPA, revised 03 Jun 1999.
19. Lagunoff, Roger, 2000. "On the Evolution of Pareto-Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 273-93, May.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 1997. "On the Evolution of Pereto Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information 9707003, EconWPA.
20. Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1999. "On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 409-427.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997. "On the Social Stability of Coalitional Property Rights Regimes," Game Theory and Information 9707007, EconWPA.
21. Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger, 1999. "A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 659-77, July.
22. Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1999. "Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 531-567.
    • Lagunoff, Roger & Schreft, Stacey L, 1999. "Financial Fragility with Rational And Irrational Exuberance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 531-60, August.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1999. "Financial Fragility with Rational and Irrational Exuberance," Macroeconomics 9904011, EconWPA.
    • Roger D. Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1999. "Financial fragility with rational and irrational exuberance," Research Working Paper 99-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
23. Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger, 1998. "A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 91-112, April.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997. "A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods," Game Theory and Information 9707008, EconWPA.
24. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1467-1478, November.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsu, . "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Penn CARESS Working Papers 23a1aa461811b8f48b0334f6e, Penn Economics Department.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsu, . ""Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games''," CARESS Working Papres 96-10, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    • Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information 9707002, EconWPA.
25. Lagunoff, Roger, 1997. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1699-1725, August.
    • Roger Lagunoff, 1995. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 100, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
26. Glomn G. & Lagunoff, R. D., 1996. "Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-59, February.
    • Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger D., 1995. "Specialization, inequality and the social stability of economies with collective property rights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 245-261, December.
27. Lagunoff, Roger D & Matsui, Akihiko, 1995. "Evolution in Mechanisms for Public Projects," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 195-223, July.
28. Lagunoff Roger D., 1995. "Resilient Allocation Rules for Bilateral Trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 463-487, August.
29. Lagunoff Roger D., 1994. "A Simple Noncooperative Core Story," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 54-61, July.
30. Lagunoff, Roger, 1992. "Fully Endogenous Mechanism Selection on Finite Outcome Sets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 465-80, October.

NEP Fields

49 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):

1. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (2) 2007-02-10 2007-07-13
2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (4) 2008-06-27 2010-06-04 2010-08-06 2010-12-18
3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (4) 2008-02-09 2008-02-16 2009-02-07 2009-02-14
4. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (3) 2004-08-02 2005-02-01 2005-05-14
5. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (2) 2000-10-05 2004-09-12
6. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (2) 1998-10-08 1998-10-15
7. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (17) 1998-10-02 1999-02-15 1999-02-15 1999-06-23 2002-10-08 2002-11-18 2003-03-10 2003-06-16 2005-04-16 2005-05-14 2005-12-01 2006-05-20 2006-11-04 2007-03-17 2008-02-09 2009-02-07 2009-02-14 Author is listed
8. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2009-02-07
9. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (1) 2008-02-16
10. NEP-IFN: International Finance (2) 1998-10-02 1998-10-15
11. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (3) 1999-06-23 2002-11-18 2006-05-20
12. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (6) 1999-02-15 2001-05-02 2001-07-30 2002-10-11 2004-08-16 2004-11-22 Author is listed
13. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (3) 2000-08-07 2002-11-18 2005-11-12
14. NEP-PKE: Post Keynesian Economics (2) 1998-10-05 1998-10-15
15. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (9) 2000-08-07 2004-10-30 2005-02-01 2005-04-16 2005-10-22 2005-11-12 2008-06-27 2010-06-04 2010-08-06 Author is listed
16. NEP-REG: Regulation (2) 2004-10-30 2005-05-14
17. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (1) 2003-08-17
18. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (5) 2005-10-22 2005-11-12 2007-02-10 2007-03-10 2007-07-13 Author is listed

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:

1. Number of Works
2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
6. Number of Journal Pages
7. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
8. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
9. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
10. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
11. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Most cited item

• Roger D. Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1998. "A model of financial fragility," Research Working Paper 98-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

• Lagunoff, Roger & Schreft, Stacey L., 2001. "A Model of Financial Fragility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 220-264, July.

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

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