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Markov Perfect equilibria in repeated asynchronous choice games

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  • Haller, Hans
  • Lagunoff, Roger

Abstract

This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of Markov Perfect equilibria in alternating move repeated games. Such games are canonical models of environments with repeated, asynchronous choices due to inertia or replacement. Our main result is that the number of Markov Perfect equilibria is generically finite with respect to stage game payoffs. This holds despite the fact that the stochastic game representation of the alternating move repeated game is "non-generic" in the larger space of state dependent payoffs. We further obtain that the set of completely mixed Markov Perfect equilibria is generically empty with respect to stage game payoffs.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1103-1114

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:6:p:1103-1114

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Repeated games Asynchronous choice Alternating moves Stochastic games Markov Perfect equilibria Genericity;

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References

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  1. Yoon, Kiho, 2001. "A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 191-200, January.
  2. Park, I.U., 1993. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distribution for Sender Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Papers 269, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
  3. Robert Wilson, 2010. "Computing Equilibria of n-person Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 402, David K. Levine.
  4. Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Game Theory and Information 9901003, EconWPA, revised 03 Jun 1999.
  5. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information 9707002, EconWPA.
  6. Prajit K. Dutta, 1997. "A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1000, David K. Levine.
  7. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-69, May.
  8. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III : Cournot competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 947-968, June.
  9. Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters,Ronald J.A.P, 2000. "Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games: Structure, Selection, and Computation," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  10. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
  11. Bhaskar, V. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2002. "Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 334-350, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Andrew McLennan & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining," Economics Working Paper Archive 562, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  2. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2006. "Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 199, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  3. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2007. "Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 210, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  4. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2010. "Global dynamics in repeated games with additively separable payoffs," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(4), pages 899-918, October.
  5. Sibdari, Soheil & Pyke, David F., 2014. "Dynamic pricing with uncertain production cost: An alternating-move approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(1), pages 218-228.

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