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Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups'

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Author Info
Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University and Southampton University)
Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University)

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Abstract

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game. Past information is therefore conveyed from one cohort to the next by means of communication. When communication is costless and messages are sent simultaneously, communication mechanisms or protocols exist that sustain the same set of equilibrium payoffs as in the standard repeated game. When communication is costless but sequential, the incentives to `whitewash' the unobservable past history of play become pervasive. These incentives to whitewash can only be countered if some player serves as a `neutral historian' who verifies the truthfulness of others' reports while remaining indifferent in the process. By contrast, when communication is sequential and (lexicographically) costly, all protocols admit only equilibria that sustain stage Nash equilibrium payoffs. We also analyze a centralized communication protocol in which history leaves a `footprint' that can only be hidden by the current cohort in a unanimous `coverup'. We show that in this case only weakly renegotiation proof payoffs are sustainable in equilibrium.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0107001.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 23 Jul 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0107001

Note: Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on Dell PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 37 ; figures: included
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Dynastic Repeated Games; Communication; Whitewashing; Coverups;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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  1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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