This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Luca Anderlini
Dino Gerardi
Roger Lagunoff

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/lagunofr/Folk.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000926.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 14 Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000926

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (David K. Levine).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0410001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Salant, David J., 1991. "A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 244-259, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
  4. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Bhaskar, V, 1998. "Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 135-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Olivier Compte, 1998. "Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 597-626, May.
  8. Hajime Kobayashi, 2007. "Folk Theorems For Infinitely Repeated Games Played By Organizations With Short-Lived Members," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 517-549, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Shotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001. "Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach," Working Papers 01-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff, 2005. "Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 265-299, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Wallace, Neil, 2001. "Whither Monetary Economics?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 847-69, November.
  12. Chaudhuri, A. & Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001. "Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice," Working Papers 01-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Discussion Papers 892R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Dean Corbae & Ted Temzelides & Randall Wright, 2002. "Matching and Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 67-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Cremer, Jacques, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Ellison, Glenn, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  23. Johnson, Philip & Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2001. "Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 1-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.