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Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Schotter, Andrew
Sopher, Barry
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 58 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 365-393
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:2:p:365-393Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991.
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American Economic Review ,
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Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2000.
"Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-Generational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics ,"
Working Papers
00-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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Other versions: Nyarko, Yaw & Schotter, Andrew, 1998.
"An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Real Beliefs ,"
Working Papers
98-39, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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Brandts, J. & Charness, G., 1998.
"Hot Vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games ,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
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Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 1998.
"Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games ,"
Economics Working Papers
321, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!] Gary Charness & Jordi Brandts, 1998.
"Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games ,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
36-98, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
[Downloadable!] Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000.
"Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games ,"
Experimental Economics ,
Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 227-238, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995.
"Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
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Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991.
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Working papers
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Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993.
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2147, David K. Levine.
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"Self-Confirming Equilibrium ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May.
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"Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 559-573, June.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Ananish Chaudhuri & Pushkar Maitra, 2004.
"Dynamic Analysis of the Evolution of Conventions in a Public Goods Experiment with Intergenerational Advice ,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
37, Econometric Society.
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Other versions: Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007.
"Social Memory and Evidence from the Past ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000850, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Levine's Bibliography
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Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004.
"The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1490, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004.
"The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000577, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004.
"The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Game Theory and Information
0410001, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), .
"The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Working Papers
gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Olivier Armantier & Nicolas Treich, 2006.
"Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities ,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2006s-15, CIRANO.
[Downloadable!]
Andrew Schotter, 2003.
"Decision Making with Naive Advice ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 196-201, May.
[Downloadable!]
Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007.
"A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Chaudhuri, A. & Schotter, A. & Sopher, B., 2001.
"Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice ,"
Working Papers
01-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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David Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2005.
"Nonbinding Suggestions: The Relative Effects of Focal Points versus Uncertainty Reduction on Bargaining Outcomes ,"
Working Papers
05-13, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
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Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008.
"A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Brit Grosskopf & Yoella Bereby-Meyer & Max Bazerman, 2007.
"On the Robustness of the Winner’s Curse Phenomenon ,"
Theory and Decision ,
Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 389-418, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Boðaçhan Çelen & Shachar Kariv & Andrew Schotter, 2006.
"An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000272, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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