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Big Experimenter Is Watching You! Anonymity and Prosocial Behavior in the Laboratory

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  • Barmettler, Franziska

    ()
    (Foundation for Global Sustainability)

  • Fehr, Ernst

    ()
    (University of Zurich)

  • Zehnder, Christian

    ()
    (University of Lausanne)

Abstract

Social preference research has received considerable attention in recent years. Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important implications in many economic domains. However, it is important to be aware of the fact that the empirical basis of this literature relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make it difficult to isolate the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial behavior. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. Our data does not support the hypothesis that introducing experimenter-subject anonymity affects observed prosocial behavior. We do not observe significant effects of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial behavior in any of our games.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 5925.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 75 (1), 17-34
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5925

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Keywords: laboratory experiments; scrutiny; anonymity; prosocial behavior;

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Cited by:
  1. Cary Deck & Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker, 2012. "An Examination of the Effect of Messages on Cooperation under Double-Blind and Single-Blind Payoff Procedures," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance 12/17, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
  2. Shoji, Masahiro, 2013. "Guilt aversion and peer effects in crime: experimental and empirical evidence from Bangladesh," MPRA Paper 44746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Cary Deck & Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker, 2011. "Do People Keep Socially Unverifiable Promises?," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance 11/39, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
  4. Hong Lin & David Ong, 2011. "Separating Gratitude from Guilt in the Laboratory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000309, David K. Levine.
  5. Levati, M. Vittoria & Nicholas, Aaron & Rai, Birendra, 2014. "Testing the single-peakedness of other-regarding preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 197-209.
  6. Stoop, Jan, 2012. "From the lab to the field: envelopes, dictators and manners," MPRA Paper 37048, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Pelligra, Vittorio & Stanca, Luca, 2013. "To give or not to give? Equity, efficiency and altruistic behavior in an artefactual field experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-9.
  8. Masahiro Shoji, 2014. "Channels of Peer Effects and Guilt Aversion in Crime: Experimental and Empirical Evidence from Bangladesh," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-923, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

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