Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
AbstractSocial preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these conditions. We identify cases in which a sophisticated planner cognizant of these non-additive effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent. JEL Categories: D52, D64, H21. H41
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics in its series UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers with number 2008-06.
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Social preferences; implementation theory; incentive contracts; incomplete contracts; framing; motivational crowding out; ethical norms; constitutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2008-04-04 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CBE-2008-04-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2008-04-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2008-04-04 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-04-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2008-04-04 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2008-04-04 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-04-04 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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