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A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

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Author Info
Fehr, Ernst
Schmidt, Klaus M.

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Abstract

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1812.

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Date of creation: Mar 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1812

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Related research
Keywords: Bargaining experimental economics Public Goods Reciprocity utility theory

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-4.

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